Henri EugĂšne Navarre (31 July 1898, Villefranche-de-Rouergue, Aveyron â 26 September 1983, Paris) was a French Army general.
He fought during World War I, World War II and was the seventh and final commander of French Far East Expeditionary Corps during the First Indochina War.
From 1938 to 1940 he was assigned to the German section of the Intelligence Service of the General Staff.
While there, he submitted a proposal code named "Desperado", outlining a plan to assassinate Hitler.
The project drew little support from his superior, Colonel Louis Rivet, and was ultimately rejected by Prime Minister Ădouard Daladier.After the Armistice of 22 June 1940, Navarre was appointed head of the intelligence and counter-espionage bureau of General Maxime Weygand in Algiers.
When he was recalled in 1942 for his anti-German activities, he went underground, joining the Resistance as head of the ORA.
The French government wanted to stabilize the situation so that they could begin peace negotiations on favorable terms: military victory was no longer an objective.Navarre's instructions were to insure the safety of the troops under his command.
Instead, he undertook Operation Castor on 20 November 1953.
Five French battalions parachuted into Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? in the Mu?ng Thanh Valley, a 20-km-long, 6-km-wide basin surrounded by hills.
Navarre hoped to draw the Viet Minh into a pitched battle where he hoped to defeat them.Authorities in France did not learn of the operation until six hours after it started.
Things went wrong almost immediately.
The French position came under heavy, unanticipated artillery fire from the surrounding hills.
Troops were unable to execute any missions beyond the valley floor, limiting actions to patrols and local counterattacks.
It became increasingly difficult to bring in supplies by air, or to provide air support.
After intelligence reports on 3 December 1953 showed four enemy Divisions closing on Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph?, Navarre issued instructions accepting battle and calling for Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? to be held at all costs.
By January 1954 he started exploring plans for withdrawal.
He soon realized any breakout attempt would be suicidal.
No significant attempt to break out was ever made.
Complicating the situation, Navarre initiated a second offensive operation on 12 December 1953, committing nearly twice as many troops to Operation Atlante in south central Vietnam, over 400 miles from Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph?.
Navarre saw Operation Atlante as his main effort; he did not believe that Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? would be a decisive operation.
He even speculated that the loss of Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? Dien was strategically acceptable.Navarre failed to consider the devastating effect the loss would have on Army morale, and the resulting loss of political support for the war at home.
By 13 March 1954 the attack on Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? had begun.
The French garrison numbered about 13,000; the Viet Minh massed more than 50,000 men.After some initial success, Operation Atlante quickly bogged down into a series of Viet Minh ambushes on French convoys.
The French eventually terminated Operation Atlante with no tangible gains while Ăi?n BiĂȘn Ph? was lost on 7 May 1954, after a siege of 54 days.
Peace talks began in Geneva the next morning.
Any negotiating advantage the French government had expected had been lost by Navarre's miscalculations.
The First Indochina War was over.
Considered responsible for the loss, Navarre was replaced 3 June 1954 by General Paul Ăly.
He remained in the Army, retiring in 1956.
In the same year he published Agonie de l'Indochine, a work which blamed the Indochina defeat on the nature of the French political system, intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and Communists.
The book warned of the possible necessity for an army coup to replace the French Fourth Republic.